一个非常现实的威胁
自从臭名昭著的Stuxnet网络攻击摧毁了伊朗的铀处理能力十年前,工业控制系统已被一个已知的网络罪犯的目标。
水行业,网络攻击是一个非常现实的威胁。
已经有大量的事件在过去的几年里,最近在以色列攻击4月看到一个认真尝试增加饮用水中氯含量。甚至最近的袭击事件已报告。
根据一项新的分析从思科系统和雅各布斯工程、数字网络等新技术的采用,远程操作,实时数据采集和分析,意味着水系统是数字化安全不如以前。
因此,门已经开了相当大的关键基础设施网络的风险。
网络攻击的本质的变化
试图解决这个问题,2018年,美国的水基础设施法案要求美国供水系统服务超过3300人开发或更新他们的风险评估和应急响应计划,包括网络安全操作技术。
然而,对于许多水务,即使那些成千上万的个体,没有这样的法律规定。
也许更麻烦的是,许多这样的工具不认真考虑网络攻击的风险性质的变化。
“供水行业的风险是,网络正在改变,”巴里·塞尔说,Intqual职业培训主管。
Aquatech在线发表讲话时,他说:“从它和数据盗窃破坏操作技术用于犯罪目的。有一个巨大的转变。”
“威胁组织已经意识到,如果他们可以限制访问等关键系统SCADA,他们可以赚更多的钱。”
他补充道:“先前攻击都是关于数据盗窃,但在过去两到三年,改变了拒绝服务攻击。威胁组织已经意识到,如果他们可以限制访问等关键系统SCADA或操作技术,他们可以赚更多的钱。”
确保可靠和健壮的安全
思科/雅各布斯white paper ‘Cities and Communities: Cybersecurity for Water Utilities’ highlights the need for water utilities to identify cyber vulnerabilities and adopt solutions.
These should result in reliable and robust security to ensure the public health and operational resiliency.
Unfortunately, the distributed nature of many small water supply networks also potentially increases their vulnerability to cyberattack.
Independent IT expert Jonathan Aslin, operations director at Intsilo, believes the water sector has some catching up to do on cybersecurity.
“Although the water industry is generally local in nature, rather than national like the electricity grid or international like finance, and might be considered a less obvious target, the source and reach of the threat can be global,” he says.
“All infrastructure presents an attractive target, so if the water industry in its widest form is less well defended than other sectors, then state or non-state actors might seek to exploit the weak areas.”
According to Cisco and Jacobs, cybersecurity shares many similarities with 'defence in depth' physical security. The key to protecting industrial control networks is to minimise exposure with a clear and well-defined separation of operational technology, the enterprise network, and the cloud.
This approach enables organisations to employ well-defined border protections. However, simply protecting the boundary is not enough as no single product or technology can fully secure water assets.
“Water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences.”
Instead, water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences. While attacks may breach one or more lines of defence, it becomes steadily more difficult to overcome each additional barrier.
Building a multi-layered defence
As well as building multi-layered defences, it’s important to note that threats are continually evolving.
“The state-sponsored threat is the highest it has ever been at the moment. They all have a better offensive cyber capability than we have a cyber defensive capability,” adds Searle.
He says: “It is very difficult to prevent cyberattacks, it's about cyber resilience and for us the water industry doesn't have any. They are just relying on luck, and the regulators aren't pressing them.
white paper ‘Cities and Communities: Cybersecurity for Water Utilities’ highlights the need for water utilities to identify cyber vulnerabilities and adopt solutions.
These should result in reliable and robust security to ensure the public health and operational resiliency.
Unfortunately, the distributed nature of many small water supply networks also potentially increases their vulnerability to cyberattack.
Independent IT expert Jonathan Aslin, operations director at Intsilo, believes the water sector has some catching up to do on cybersecurity.
“Although the water industry is generally local in nature, rather than national like the electricity grid or international like finance, and might be considered a less obvious target, the source and reach of the threat can be global,” he says.
“All infrastructure presents an attractive target, so if the water industry in its widest form is less well defended than other sectors, then state or non-state actors might seek to exploit the weak areas.”
According to Cisco and Jacobs, cybersecurity shares many similarities with 'defence in depth' physical security. The key to protecting industrial control networks is to minimise exposure with a clear and well-defined separation of operational technology, the enterprise network, and the cloud.
This approach enables organisations to employ well-defined border protections. However, simply protecting the boundary is not enough as no single product or technology can fully secure water assets.
“Water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences.”
Instead, water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences. While attacks may breach one or more lines of defence, it becomes steadily more difficult to overcome each additional barrier.
Building a multi-layered defence
As well as building multi-layered defences, it’s important to note that threats are continually evolving.
“The state-sponsored threat is the highest it has ever been at the moment. They all have a better offensive cyber capability than we have a cyber defensive capability,” adds Searle.
He says: “It is very difficult to prevent cyberattacks, it's about cyber resilience and for us the water industry doesn't have any. They are just relying on luck, and the regulators aren't pressing them.
“水行业需要意识到,仅仅因为他们没有重大国际事件并不意味着他们不会。其他行业需要从中吸取教训,成为主动的而不是被动的。”
white paper ‘Cities and Communities: Cybersecurity for Water Utilities’ highlights the need for water utilities to identify cyber vulnerabilities and adopt solutions.
These should result in reliable and robust security to ensure the public health and operational resiliency.
Unfortunately, the distributed nature of many small water supply networks also potentially increases their vulnerability to cyberattack.
Independent IT expert Jonathan Aslin, operations director at Intsilo, believes the water sector has some catching up to do on cybersecurity.
“Although the water industry is generally local in nature, rather than national like the electricity grid or international like finance, and might be considered a less obvious target, the source and reach of the threat can be global,” he says.
“All infrastructure presents an attractive target, so if the water industry in its widest form is less well defended than other sectors, then state or non-state actors might seek to exploit the weak areas.”
According to Cisco and Jacobs, cybersecurity shares many similarities with 'defence in depth' physical security. The key to protecting industrial control networks is to minimise exposure with a clear and well-defined separation of operational technology, the enterprise network, and the cloud.
This approach enables organisations to employ well-defined border protections. However, simply protecting the boundary is not enough as no single product or technology can fully secure water assets.
“Water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences.”
Instead, water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences. While attacks may breach one or more lines of defence, it becomes steadily more difficult to overcome each additional barrier.
Building a multi-layered defence
As well as building multi-layered defences, it’s important to note that threats are continually evolving.
“The state-sponsored threat is the highest it has ever been at the moment. They all have a better offensive cyber capability than we have a cyber defensive capability,” adds Searle.
He says: “It is very difficult to prevent cyberattacks, it's about cyber resilience and for us the water industry doesn't have any. They are just relying on luck, and the regulators aren't pressing them.
任何中断或失败在水中操作控制系统可能导致受伤或死亡,但水资产代表了一个更大的威胁和潜在的风险价值。
white paper ‘Cities and Communities: Cybersecurity for Water Utilities’ highlights the need for water utilities to identify cyber vulnerabilities and adopt solutions.
These should result in reliable and robust security to ensure the public health and operational resiliency.
Unfortunately, the distributed nature of many small water supply networks also potentially increases their vulnerability to cyberattack.
Independent IT expert Jonathan Aslin, operations director at Intsilo, believes the water sector has some catching up to do on cybersecurity.
“Although the water industry is generally local in nature, rather than national like the electricity grid or international like finance, and might be considered a less obvious target, the source and reach of the threat can be global,” he says.
“All infrastructure presents an attractive target, so if the water industry in its widest form is less well defended than other sectors, then state or non-state actors might seek to exploit the weak areas.”
According to Cisco and Jacobs, cybersecurity shares many similarities with 'defence in depth' physical security. The key to protecting industrial control networks is to minimise exposure with a clear and well-defined separation of operational technology, the enterprise network, and the cloud.
This approach enables organisations to employ well-defined border protections. However, simply protecting the boundary is not enough as no single product or technology can fully secure water assets.
“Water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences.”
Instead, water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences. While attacks may breach one or more lines of defence, it becomes steadily more difficult to overcome each additional barrier.
Building a multi-layered defence
As well as building multi-layered defences, it’s important to note that threats are continually evolving.
“The state-sponsored threat is the highest it has ever been at the moment. They all have a better offensive cyber capability than we have a cyber defensive capability,” adds Searle.
He says: “It is very difficult to prevent cyberattacks, it's about cyber resilience and for us the water industry doesn't have any. They are just relying on luck, and the regulators aren't pressing them.
“我们应该好好记住,超出饮用水污染的威胁,包括间接损害通过洪水造成的干扰大坝、水库、油底壳泵,排水和污水系统,和身体造成的损害水冷却系统的失败,“Aslin补充道。
white paper ‘Cities and Communities: Cybersecurity for Water Utilities’ highlights the need for water utilities to identify cyber vulnerabilities and adopt solutions.
These should result in reliable and robust security to ensure the public health and operational resiliency.
Unfortunately, the distributed nature of many small water supply networks also potentially increases their vulnerability to cyberattack.
Independent IT expert Jonathan Aslin, operations director at Intsilo, believes the water sector has some catching up to do on cybersecurity.
“Although the water industry is generally local in nature, rather than national like the electricity grid or international like finance, and might be considered a less obvious target, the source and reach of the threat can be global,” he says.
“All infrastructure presents an attractive target, so if the water industry in its widest form is less well defended than other sectors, then state or non-state actors might seek to exploit the weak areas.”
According to Cisco and Jacobs, cybersecurity shares many similarities with 'defence in depth' physical security. The key to protecting industrial control networks is to minimise exposure with a clear and well-defined separation of operational technology, the enterprise network, and the cloud.
This approach enables organisations to employ well-defined border protections. However, simply protecting the boundary is not enough as no single product or technology can fully secure water assets.
“Water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences.”
Instead, water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences. While attacks may breach one or more lines of defence, it becomes steadily more difficult to overcome each additional barrier.
Building a multi-layered defence
As well as building multi-layered defences, it’s important to note that threats are continually evolving.
“The state-sponsored threat is the highest it has ever been at the moment. They all have a better offensive cyber capability than we have a cyber defensive capability,” adds Searle.
He says: “It is very difficult to prevent cyberattacks, it's about cyber resilience and for us the water industry doesn't have any. They are just relying on luck, and the regulators aren't pressing them.
“这礼物无数的弱点来保护,在供应链中,和在一个分散的网络组织。”
white paper ‘Cities and Communities: Cybersecurity for Water Utilities’ highlights the need for water utilities to identify cyber vulnerabilities and adopt solutions.
These should result in reliable and robust security to ensure the public health and operational resiliency.
Unfortunately, the distributed nature of many small water supply networks also potentially increases their vulnerability to cyberattack.
Independent IT expert Jonathan Aslin, operations director at Intsilo, believes the water sector has some catching up to do on cybersecurity.
“Although the water industry is generally local in nature, rather than national like the electricity grid or international like finance, and might be considered a less obvious target, the source and reach of the threat can be global,” he says.
“All infrastructure presents an attractive target, so if the water industry in its widest form is less well defended than other sectors, then state or non-state actors might seek to exploit the weak areas.”
According to Cisco and Jacobs, cybersecurity shares many similarities with 'defence in depth' physical security. The key to protecting industrial control networks is to minimise exposure with a clear and well-defined separation of operational technology, the enterprise network, and the cloud.
This approach enables organisations to employ well-defined border protections. However, simply protecting the boundary is not enough as no single product or technology can fully secure water assets.
“Water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences.”
Instead, water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences. While attacks may breach one or more lines of defence, it becomes steadily more difficult to overcome each additional barrier.
Building a multi-layered defence
As well as building multi-layered defences, it’s important to note that threats are continually evolving.
“The state-sponsored threat is the highest it has ever been at the moment. They all have a better offensive cyber capability than we have a cyber defensive capability,” adds Searle.
He says: “It is very difficult to prevent cyberattacks, it's about cyber resilience and for us the water industry doesn't have any. They are just relying on luck, and the regulators aren't pressing them.
一个文化转变是必需的
white paper ‘Cities and Communities: Cybersecurity for Water Utilities’ highlights the need for water utilities to identify cyber vulnerabilities and adopt solutions.
These should result in reliable and robust security to ensure the public health and operational resiliency.
Unfortunately, the distributed nature of many small water supply networks also potentially increases their vulnerability to cyberattack.
Independent IT expert Jonathan Aslin, operations director at Intsilo, believes the water sector has some catching up to do on cybersecurity.
“Although the water industry is generally local in nature, rather than national like the electricity grid or international like finance, and might be considered a less obvious target, the source and reach of the threat can be global,” he says.
“All infrastructure presents an attractive target, so if the water industry in its widest form is less well defended than other sectors, then state or non-state actors might seek to exploit the weak areas.”
According to Cisco and Jacobs, cybersecurity shares many similarities with 'defence in depth' physical security. The key to protecting industrial control networks is to minimise exposure with a clear and well-defined separation of operational technology, the enterprise network, and the cloud.
This approach enables organisations to employ well-defined border protections. However, simply protecting the boundary is not enough as no single product or technology can fully secure water assets.
“Water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences.”
Instead, water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences. While attacks may breach one or more lines of defence, it becomes steadily more difficult to overcome each additional barrier.
Building a multi-layered defence
As well as building multi-layered defences, it’s important to note that threats are continually evolving.
“The state-sponsored threat is the highest it has ever been at the moment. They all have a better offensive cyber capability than we have a cyber defensive capability,” adds Searle.
He says: “It is very difficult to prevent cyberattacks, it's about cyber resilience and for us the water industry doesn't have any. They are just relying on luck, and the regulators aren't pressing them.
因此,水行业运营商必须执行一个全面评估,以了解他们的弱点。
white paper ‘Cities and Communities: Cybersecurity for Water Utilities’ highlights the need for water utilities to identify cyber vulnerabilities and adopt solutions.
These should result in reliable and robust security to ensure the public health and operational resiliency.
Unfortunately, the distributed nature of many small water supply networks also potentially increases their vulnerability to cyberattack.
Independent IT expert Jonathan Aslin, operations director at Intsilo, believes the water sector has some catching up to do on cybersecurity.
“Although the water industry is generally local in nature, rather than national like the electricity grid or international like finance, and might be considered a less obvious target, the source and reach of the threat can be global,” he says.
“All infrastructure presents an attractive target, so if the water industry in its widest form is less well defended than other sectors, then state or non-state actors might seek to exploit the weak areas.”
According to Cisco and Jacobs, cybersecurity shares many similarities with 'defence in depth' physical security. The key to protecting industrial control networks is to minimise exposure with a clear and well-defined separation of operational technology, the enterprise network, and the cloud.
This approach enables organisations to employ well-defined border protections. However, simply protecting the boundary is not enough as no single product or technology can fully secure water assets.
“Water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences.”
Instead, water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences. While attacks may breach one or more lines of defence, it becomes steadily more difficult to overcome each additional barrier.
Building a multi-layered defence
As well as building multi-layered defences, it’s important to note that threats are continually evolving.
“The state-sponsored threat is the highest it has ever been at the moment. They all have a better offensive cyber capability than we have a cyber defensive capability,” adds Searle.
He says: “It is very difficult to prevent cyberattacks, it's about cyber resilience and for us the water industry doesn't have any. They are just relying on luck, and the regulators aren't pressing them.
他们应该遵循这一个健壮的发展计划,可以确保网络安全在整个数字企业不仅仅是今天,但也认为未来的安全基础设施需求。
These should result in reliable and robust security to ensure the public health and operational resiliency.
Unfortunately, the distributed nature of many small water supply networks also potentially increases their vulnerability to cyberattack.
Independent IT expert Jonathan Aslin, operations director at Intsilo, believes the water sector has some catching up to do on cybersecurity.
“Although the water industry is generally local in nature, rather than national like the electricity grid or international like finance, and might be considered a less obvious target, the source and reach of the threat can be global,” he says.
“All infrastructure presents an attractive target, so if the water industry in its widest form is less well defended than other sectors, then state or non-state actors might seek to exploit the weak areas.”
According to Cisco and Jacobs, cybersecurity shares many similarities with 'defence in depth' physical security. The key to protecting industrial control networks is to minimise exposure with a clear and well-defined separation of operational technology, the enterprise network, and the cloud.
This approach enables organisations to employ well-defined border protections. However, simply protecting the boundary is not enough as no single product or technology can fully secure water assets.
“Water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences.”
Instead, water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences. While attacks may breach one or more lines of defence, it becomes steadily more difficult to overcome each additional barrier.
Building a multi-layered defence
As well as building multi-layered defences, it’s important to note that threats are continually evolving.
“The state-sponsored threat is the highest it has ever been at the moment. They all have a better offensive cyber capability than we have a cyber defensive capability,” adds Searle.
He says: “It is very difficult to prevent cyberattacks, it's about cyber resilience and for us the water industry doesn't have any. They are just relying on luck, and the regulators aren't pressing them.
“金融服务是未来10年的水…我没有看到相同级别的投资或参与供水行业。”
white paper ‘Cities and Communities: Cybersecurity for Water Utilities’ highlights the need for water utilities to identify cyber vulnerabilities and adopt solutions.
These should result in reliable and robust security to ensure the public health and operational resiliency.
Unfortunately, the distributed nature of many small water supply networks also potentially increases their vulnerability to cyberattack.
Independent IT expert Jonathan Aslin, operations director at Intsilo, believes the water sector has some catching up to do on cybersecurity.
“Although the water industry is generally local in nature, rather than national like the electricity grid or international like finance, and might be considered a less obvious target, the source and reach of the threat can be global,” he says.
“All infrastructure presents an attractive target, so if the water industry in its widest form is less well defended than other sectors, then state or non-state actors might seek to exploit the weak areas.”
According to Cisco and Jacobs, cybersecurity shares many similarities with 'defence in depth' physical security. The key to protecting industrial control networks is to minimise exposure with a clear and well-defined separation of operational technology, the enterprise network, and the cloud.
This approach enables organisations to employ well-defined border protections. However, simply protecting the boundary is not enough as no single product or technology can fully secure water assets.
“Water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences.”
Instead, water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences. While attacks may breach one or more lines of defence, it becomes steadily more difficult to overcome each additional barrier.
Building a multi-layered defence
As well as building multi-layered defences, it’s important to note that threats are continually evolving.
“The state-sponsored threat is the highest it has ever been at the moment. They all have a better offensive cyber capability than we have a cyber defensive capability,” adds Searle.
He says: “It is very difficult to prevent cyberattacks, it's about cyber resilience and for us the water industry doesn't have any. They are just relying on luck, and the regulators aren't pressing them.
这可能需要一个文化转变,根据塞尔。
white paper ‘Cities and Communities: Cybersecurity for Water Utilities’ highlights the need for water utilities to identify cyber vulnerabilities and adopt solutions.
These should result in reliable and robust security to ensure the public health and operational resiliency.
Unfortunately, the distributed nature of many small water supply networks also potentially increases their vulnerability to cyberattack.
Independent IT expert Jonathan Aslin, operations director at Intsilo, believes the water sector has some catching up to do on cybersecurity.
“Although the water industry is generally local in nature, rather than national like the electricity grid or international like finance, and might be considered a less obvious target, the source and reach of the threat can be global,” he says.
“All infrastructure presents an attractive target, so if the water industry in its widest form is less well defended than other sectors, then state or non-state actors might seek to exploit the weak areas.”
According to Cisco and Jacobs, cybersecurity shares many similarities with 'defence in depth' physical security. The key to protecting industrial control networks is to minimise exposure with a clear and well-defined separation of operational technology, the enterprise network, and the cloud.
This approach enables organisations to employ well-defined border protections. However, simply protecting the boundary is not enough as no single product or technology can fully secure water assets.
“Water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences.”
Instead, water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences. While attacks may breach one or more lines of defence, it becomes steadily more difficult to overcome each additional barrier.
Building a multi-layered defence
As well as building multi-layered defences, it’s important to note that threats are continually evolving.
“The state-sponsored threat is the highest it has ever been at the moment. They all have a better offensive cyber capability than we have a cyber defensive capability,” adds Searle.
He says: “It is very difficult to prevent cyberattacks, it's about cyber resilience and for us the water industry doesn't have any. They are just relying on luck, and the regulators aren't pressing them.
“金融服务可能是10几年的水行业,因为商业银行风险数据保护意义重大,”他补充道。
white paper ‘Cities and Communities: Cybersecurity for Water Utilities’ highlights the need for water utilities to identify cyber vulnerabilities and adopt solutions.
These should result in reliable and robust security to ensure the public health and operational resiliency.
Unfortunately, the distributed nature of many small water supply networks also potentially increases their vulnerability to cyberattack.
Independent IT expert Jonathan Aslin, operations director at Intsilo, believes the water sector has some catching up to do on cybersecurity.
“Although the water industry is generally local in nature, rather than national like the electricity grid or international like finance, and might be considered a less obvious target, the source and reach of the threat can be global,” he says.
“All infrastructure presents an attractive target, so if the water industry in its widest form is less well defended than other sectors, then state or non-state actors might seek to exploit the weak areas.”
According to Cisco and Jacobs, cybersecurity shares many similarities with 'defence in depth' physical security. The key to protecting industrial control networks is to minimise exposure with a clear and well-defined separation of operational technology, the enterprise network, and the cloud.
This approach enables organisations to employ well-defined border protections. However, simply protecting the boundary is not enough as no single product or technology can fully secure water assets.
“Water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences.”
Instead, water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences. While attacks may breach one or more lines of defence, it becomes steadily more difficult to overcome each additional barrier.
Building a multi-layered defence
As well as building multi-layered defences, it’s important to note that threats are continually evolving.
“The state-sponsored threat is the highest it has ever been at the moment. They all have a better offensive cyber capability than we have a cyber defensive capability,” adds Searle.
He says: “It is very difficult to prevent cyberattacks, it's about cyber resilience and for us the water industry doesn't have any. They are just relying on luck, and the regulators aren't pressing them.
“电力行业,保护资产,确保网络和理解允许承包商的风险来插入外部设备是网络安全的重要组成部分投资,因为他们希望获得工程方面。我没有看到相同级别的投资或参与供水行业。”
white paper ‘Cities and Communities: Cybersecurity for Water Utilities’ highlights the need for water utilities to identify cyber vulnerabilities and adopt solutions.
These should result in reliable and robust security to ensure the public health and operational resiliency.
Unfortunately, the distributed nature of many small water supply networks also potentially increases their vulnerability to cyberattack.
Independent IT expert Jonathan Aslin, operations director at Intsilo, believes the water sector has some catching up to do on cybersecurity.
“Although the water industry is generally local in nature, rather than national like the electricity grid or international like finance, and might be considered a less obvious target, the source and reach of the threat can be global,” he says.
“All infrastructure presents an attractive target, so if the water industry in its widest form is less well defended than other sectors, then state or non-state actors might seek to exploit the weak areas.”
According to Cisco and Jacobs, cybersecurity shares many similarities with 'defence in depth' physical security. The key to protecting industrial control networks is to minimise exposure with a clear and well-defined separation of operational technology, the enterprise network, and the cloud.
This approach enables organisations to employ well-defined border protections. However, simply protecting the boundary is not enough as no single product or technology can fully secure water assets.
“Water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences.”
Instead, water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences. While attacks may breach one or more lines of defence, it becomes steadily more difficult to overcome each additional barrier.
Building a multi-layered defence
As well as building multi-layered defences, it’s important to note that threats are continually evolving.
“The state-sponsored threat is the highest it has ever been at the moment. They all have a better offensive cyber capability than we have a cyber defensive capability,” adds Searle.
He says: “It is very difficult to prevent cyberattacks, it's about cyber resilience and for us the water industry doesn't have any. They are just relying on luck, and the regulators aren't pressing them.
网络攻击的潜在风险在水行业非常重要,不过,这需要改变的紧迫感。
white paper ‘Cities and Communities: Cybersecurity for Water Utilities’ highlights the need for water utilities to identify cyber vulnerabilities and adopt solutions.
These should result in reliable and robust security to ensure the public health and operational resiliency.
Unfortunately, the distributed nature of many small water supply networks also potentially increases their vulnerability to cyberattack.
Independent IT expert Jonathan Aslin, operations director at Intsilo, believes the water sector has some catching up to do on cybersecurity.
“Although the water industry is generally local in nature, rather than national like the electricity grid or international like finance, and might be considered a less obvious target, the source and reach of the threat can be global,” he says.
“All infrastructure presents an attractive target, so if the water industry in its widest form is less well defended than other sectors, then state or non-state actors might seek to exploit the weak areas.”
According to Cisco and Jacobs, cybersecurity shares many similarities with 'defence in depth' physical security. The key to protecting industrial control networks is to minimise exposure with a clear and well-defined separation of operational technology, the enterprise network, and the cloud.
This approach enables organisations to employ well-defined border protections. However, simply protecting the boundary is not enough as no single product or technology can fully secure water assets.
“Water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences.”
Instead, water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences. While attacks may breach one or more lines of defence, it becomes steadily more difficult to overcome each additional barrier.
Building a multi-layered defence
As well as building multi-layered defences, it’s important to note that threats are continually evolving.
“The state-sponsored threat is the highest it has ever been at the moment. They all have a better offensive cyber capability than we have a cyber defensive capability,” adds Searle.
He says: “It is very difficult to prevent cyberattacks, it's about cyber resilience and for us the water industry doesn't have any. They are just relying on luck, and the regulators aren't pressing them.
white paper ‘Cities and Communities: Cybersecurity for Water Utilities’ highlights the need for water utilities to identify cyber vulnerabilities and adopt solutions.
These should result in reliable and robust security to ensure the public health and operational resiliency.
Unfortunately, the distributed nature of many small water supply networks also potentially increases their vulnerability to cyberattack.
Independent IT expert Jonathan Aslin, operations director at Intsilo, believes the water sector has some catching up to do on cybersecurity.
“Although the water industry is generally local in nature, rather than national like the electricity grid or international like finance, and might be considered a less obvious target, the source and reach of the threat can be global,” he says.
“All infrastructure presents an attractive target, so if the water industry in its widest form is less well defended than other sectors, then state or non-state actors might seek to exploit the weak areas.”
According to Cisco and Jacobs, cybersecurity shares many similarities with 'defence in depth' physical security. The key to protecting industrial control networks is to minimise exposure with a clear and well-defined separation of operational technology, the enterprise network, and the cloud.
This approach enables organisations to employ well-defined border protections. However, simply protecting the boundary is not enough as no single product or technology can fully secure water assets.
“Water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences.”
Instead, water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences. While attacks may breach one or more lines of defence, it becomes steadily more difficult to overcome each additional barrier.
Building a multi-layered defence
As well as building multi-layered defences, it’s important to note that threats are continually evolving.
“The state-sponsored threat is the highest it has ever been at the moment. They all have a better offensive cyber capability than we have a cyber defensive capability,” adds Searle.
He says: “It is very difficult to prevent cyberattacks, it's about cyber resilience and for us the water industry doesn't have any. They are just relying on luck, and the regulators aren't pressing them.
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white paper ‘Cities and Communities: Cybersecurity for Water Utilities’ highlights the need for water utilities to identify cyber vulnerabilities and adopt solutions.
These should result in reliable and robust security to ensure the public health and operational resiliency.
Unfortunately, the distributed nature of many small water supply networks also potentially increases their vulnerability to cyberattack.
Independent IT expert Jonathan Aslin, operations director at Intsilo, believes the water sector has some catching up to do on cybersecurity.
“Although the water industry is generally local in nature, rather than national like the electricity grid or international like finance, and might be considered a less obvious target, the source and reach of the threat can be global,” he says.
“All infrastructure presents an attractive target, so if the water industry in its widest form is less well defended than other sectors, then state or non-state actors might seek to exploit the weak areas.”
According to Cisco and Jacobs, cybersecurity shares many similarities with 'defence in depth' physical security. The key to protecting industrial control networks is to minimise exposure with a clear and well-defined separation of operational technology, the enterprise network, and the cloud.
This approach enables organisations to employ well-defined border protections. However, simply protecting the boundary is not enough as no single product or technology can fully secure water assets.
“Water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences.”
Instead, water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences. While attacks may breach one or more lines of defence, it becomes steadily more difficult to overcome each additional barrier.
Building a multi-layered defence
As well as building multi-layered defences, it’s important to note that threats are continually evolving.
“The state-sponsored threat is the highest it has ever been at the moment. They all have a better offensive cyber capability than we have a cyber defensive capability,” adds Searle.
He says: “It is very difficult to prevent cyberattacks, it's about cyber resilience and for us the water industry doesn't have any. They are just relying on luck, and the regulators aren't pressing them.
white paper ‘Cities and Communities: Cybersecurity for Water Utilities’ highlights the need for water utilities to identify cyber vulnerabilities and adopt solutions.
These should result in reliable and robust security to ensure the public health and operational resiliency.
Unfortunately, the distributed nature of many small water supply networks also potentially increases their vulnerability to cyberattack.
Independent IT expert Jonathan Aslin, operations director at Intsilo, believes the water sector has some catching up to do on cybersecurity.
“Although the water industry is generally local in nature, rather than national like the electricity grid or international like finance, and might be considered a less obvious target, the source and reach of the threat can be global,” he says.
“All infrastructure presents an attractive target, so if the water industry in its widest form is less well defended than other sectors, then state or non-state actors might seek to exploit the weak areas.”
According to Cisco and Jacobs, cybersecurity shares many similarities with 'defence in depth' physical security. The key to protecting industrial control networks is to minimise exposure with a clear and well-defined separation of operational technology, the enterprise network, and the cloud.
This approach enables organisations to employ well-defined border protections. However, simply protecting the boundary is not enough as no single product or technology can fully secure water assets.
“Water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences.”
Instead, water network operators need to consider multi-layered defences. While attacks may breach one or more lines of defence, it becomes steadily more difficult to overcome each additional barrier.
Building a multi-layered defence
As well as building multi-layered defences, it’s important to note that threats are continually evolving.
“The state-sponsored threat is the highest it has ever been at the moment. They all have a better offensive cyber capability than we have a cyber defensive capability,” adds Searle.
He says: “It is very difficult to prevent cyberattacks, it's about cyber resilience and for us the water industry doesn't have any. They are just relying on luck, and the regulators aren't pressing them.